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STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN PRACTICE
JOSEPH R. GRODIN*
A Review of Intellect and Craft: The Contributions of Justice Hans
Linde to American Constitutionalism, edited by Robert F. Nagel.'
Boulder: Westville Press, 1995. Pp. xi + 318, $56.00.
I. INTRODUCTION
In an era which threatens to flood us with words about the law, full of
dense theory and reiteration of doctrines and minor variations on well worn
themes as if some legal sorcerer's apprentice were out of control, the clarity and
originality of Justice Hans Linde's scholarly and judicial writings loom like an
island in a swamp. Over the span of his career as a law professor at the
University of Oregon (1959-1976), his tenure as a Justice of the Oregon
Supreme Court (1976-1989), and more recently as an itinerant academic reborn,
Justice Linde's contributions have not been wanting. He has contributed more
than his share to the body of legal literature; indeed, author of more than fifty
articles and published lectures,2 and of more than 350 judicial opinions, Linde
ranks among the most prolific of legal scholars and judges. His work, both as
a scholar and as a judge, bears always the stamp of a truly original thinker and,
whether one agrees with him or not, what Justice Linde has to say is consistently
provocative and insightful.
It is a most valuable service, therefore, that Professor Robert Nagel has
performed by bringing us, in a single volume, excerpts from seven of Justice
Linde's articles and from thirteen of his opinions, together with brief but useful
introductions by Professor Nagel, himself a scholar of note. The excerpts are,
of necessity, highly selective. Limited to the area of constitutional law, or at
Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
Former Associate Justice, California Supreme Court. J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D., London
School of Economics. The author wishes to make two disclosures of interest: (1) he was the author
of one of the California Supreme Court opinions referred to in this article (see infra note 100); (2)
he was the author of an amicus curiae brief to the California Supreme Court in American Academy
of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. 1994), in which he argued, on behalf of himself and
other constitutional law scholars, in favor of an independent interpretation of the California
Constitution.
1. INTELLECT AND CRAFT: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF JUSTICE HANS LINDE TO AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM (Robert F. Nagel ed., 1995) [hereinafter INTELLECT AND CRAFr].
2. For a bibliography of Justice Linde's works, see Symposium on the Work of Justice Hans
Linde in 70 OR. L. REv. 679 (1991).
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least public law, they naturally omit Justice Linde's other important
contributions, for example, his writings and opinions on the law of torts. Even
within the constitutional law arena, the pattern of Nagel's selections, as well as
his commentary, appear to reflect something of his own predilections.3 There
is a good deal of emphasis, for example, on those parts of Linde's writings
which are critical of certain aspects of judicial review. Nonetheless, the
excerpts do contain a representative sampling of the themes which are reflected
in Linde's writings generally, and they provide an unusual opportunity to
compare what a thoughtful person writes as a scholar with what he writes from
the bench. While some scholars-turned-jurists might not welcome that
comparison, in Linde's case it turns out there is little to fear.
Labels are tempting but often misleading and this is particularly likely to
be the case with someone of Justice Linde's caliber and originality. In a number
of respects, Linde has been highly critical over the years of the opinions of the
United States Supreme Court. In Linde's view, primary responsibility for
applying the prescriptions of the federal Constitution lies with the legislative and
executive branches, and while the Supreme Court is empowered to pass
ultimately on constitutional issues, it should do so in a way that provides
meaningful guidance to the other branches rather than in terms of directives to
the lower courts.4 In that vein, Linde deplores constitutional doctrine phrased
in terms of "fundamental rights," "strict scrutiny," "balancing," and the like.
He does not approve of the Court's willingness to find rights, such as the right
of privacy, implicit in the Constitution (writing for the Oregon Supreme Court,
he complained that "no one has ever been able to furnish a principled
constitutional explanation of the supposed right"),5 and for that matter he has
written in opposition even to the limited review for "rationality" that the Court
finds implicit in the due process principle at the lowest level of scrutiny.
Rather, Linde asserts that the Due Process Clause, insofar as it applies to
legislation, should have as its focus the process of lawmaking rather than its
results.' Linde, as a scholar, preaches judicial restraint in the sense of avoiding
3. Robert Nagel has characterized himself as having a 'generally skeptical orientation on
judicial review." Robert F. Nagel, Name Calling and the Clear Error Rule, 88 Nw. U. L. REV.
193 (1993). That is probably a fair characterization. For example, see Robert F. Nagel, How
Useful is Judicial Review in Free Speech Cases?, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 302 (1984).
4. "Turning the logic ofjudicial review right side up implies, I suggest, a principle that a judge-
made rule of constitutional law must articulate criteria with which a government conscientious about
its constitutional duties could know how to comply . . . even without judicial review." Hans A.
Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972) [hereinafter Realist
Tradition], reprinted in INTELLECT AND CRAFT, supra note 1, at 39.
5. Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123 (Or. 1981), reprinted in INTELLECT AND CRAFr, supra note
1, at 213 n.2 (quoting Sterling v. Cupp, 607 P.2d 206, 209 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (Joseph, J.,
dissenting)).
6. Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Nm. L. Rav. 197 (1976).
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the resolution of constitutional issues if at all possible, and as a jurist, has
practiced what he preached, preferring to reinterpret potential constitutional
issues into issues of statutory interpretation 7 or administrative authority.s
Finally, Linde insists as both scholar and judge that courts should avoid using
the language of legal realism that refers to the social consequences of their
decisions. Like Ronald Dworkin, Linde believes that principle, not policy, is
the proper province of the courts.1"
All of this might tempt one to characterize Linde as "conservative," and a
proponent of "judicial restraint" as those terms are used in modem legal
parlance, but one should be cautious in this characterization. Linde sees a major
role for courts in the enforcement of federal and state constitutional provisions
which have to do with governmental structure and the allocation of authority."
Furthermore, Linde is quite willing for courts to exercise extensive judicial
review in other areas, so long as it is premised upon plausibly supportive
constitutional language. In the area of free speech for example, Linde is, in
certain respects, an absolutist. As a scholar, he argued that the First
Amendment should be read as prohibiting any law phrased in terms of
speech, 2 and as a justice he followed that prescription, leading the Oregon
Supreme Court to invalidate, based on the Oregon Constitution, an ordinance
which prohibited "adult businesses" from locating in particular areas. The
Oregon Supreme Court reasoned that the term "adult businesses" was defined
based upon the content of the material they communicated.' 3 The opinion's
authors rejected the United States Supreme Court's First Amendment rationale
as expressed in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 4 that such a law should be
upheld because it aimed at the "effects" of speech rather than at the speech
itself.
Linde's post-retirement writings reflect what some might characterize
(though Linde would surely not) as quite an activist position with regard to the
7. See, e.g., Cooperv. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 4J, 723 P.2d 298 (Or. 1986), appeal dismissed,
480 U.S. 942 (1987), reprinted in INTELLECT AND CRAFT, supra note 1, at 139.
8. See, e.g., Ross v. Springfield Sch. Dist. No. 19, 716 P.2d 724 (Or. 1986), reprinted in
INTELLECT AND CRAFT, supra note 1, at 152-53 (insisting that a school board which found a
teacher's sexual conduct to be "immoral" articulate the basis for that finding).
9. See Realist Tradition, supra note 4, at 33.
10. See generally RONALD DwORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985).
11. Hans A. Linde, "A Republic... If You Can Keep It," 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295
(1989), reprinted in INTELLECT AND CRAFT, supra note 1, at 103.
12. Hans A. Linde, Courts and Censorship, 66 MINN. L. REV. 171 (1981), reprinted-in
INTELLECT AND CRAFT, supra note 1, at 43.
13. City of Portland v. Tidyman, 759 P.2d 242 (Or. 1988) (en banc), reprinted in INTELLECT
AND CRAFT, supra note 1, at 161.
14. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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initiative process. A strong believer in representative government, Linde views
"direct democracy" with suspicion, primarily because it permits the majority to
impose its will of the moment without the checks and balances that are a part of
the legislative process. He would not outlaw use of the initiative altogether, but
does advocate reliance on the Guaranty Clause of the federal Constitution,
guaranteeing to each state a "Republican Form of Government," as a basis for
striking down (or keeping off the ballot) certain initiative measures which, in his
view, contravene the principles of representative government which the clause
was designed to protect. 5 Relying upon Madisonian language to the effect that
one of the functions of representative democracy is to prevent majorities from
enacting laws out of "interest" or "passion," Linde's proposed criteria for
identifying ballot measures which offend that principle are phrased in broad
terms which necessarily call for the exercise of loosely constrained discretion.' 6
In the case of state constitutions, Justice Linde has been willing to support
judicial invalidation of legislative or administrative action on the basis of broadly
phrased provisions under circumstances which might also give pause to justices
less creative in their approach to the law. For example, Linde led the Oregon
Supreme Court to conclude that searches made by female prison guards deprived
the male prisoners of the right not to be punished with "unnecessary vigor, "17
while rejecting the male prisoners' argument that such a search infringed upon
their constitutional right of privacy. And, in a post-retirement article criticizing
state courts for following blindly in the doctrinal steps of the United States
15. Linde first advanced this thesis in Hans A. Linde, When is Initiative Lawmaking Not
'Republican Government,' 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 159 (1989). Recognizing that the United
States Supreme Court regards issues under the Guaranty Clause as non-justiciable, Linde believes
that view does not constrain state courts. Id. at 161. Linde expanded upon his thesis, in the context
of the Oregon initiative campaign aimed at homosexuals in Hans A. Linde, When Initiative
Lawmaking is Not "Republican Government": The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L.
REV. 19 (1993) [hereinafter Republican Government], reprinted in INTELLECT AND CRAFT, supra
note 1, at 125.
16. Linde would include within the categories of offensive measures not only those which on
their face refer to particular groups "in pejorative or stigmatizing terms," or which are "by their
terms directed against identifiable racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious, or other social
groups"-criteria which would capture, for example, measures aimed at homosexuals, but also
measures which are "proposed in a historical and political context in which the responsible state
officials and judges have no doubt that the initiative asks voters to choose sides for and against such
an identifiable group and that it is so understood by the public," as well as those "which appeal to
majority emotions to impose values that offend the conscience of other groups in the community
without being directed against those groups." See Republican Government, supra note 15, at 133-
34. This last category, Linde suggests, would include "[p]roposals to suppress teaching about
evolution, to replace school prayers with minutes of silence, to enact a death penalty, and perhaps
also Prohibition, abortion laws, and similarly ideological measures that sometimes sweep the country
. I d. Justice Scalia would not likely approve.
17. Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123 (Or. 1981), reprinted in INTELLECrAND CRAFT, supra note
1, at 211.
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Supreme Court, Linde suggested that a statute limiting funding for abortions
could be addressed under a state constitutional provision guaranteeing the right
to "safety and happiness."" These are not the views of one who invariably
seeks ways to constrain the judicial role.
It is in the area of state constitutionalism that Linde has made his most
notable contribution to modem American jurisprudence, and while Nagel's book
is commendable in other respects, it fails to do Linde's contribution adequate
justice. The only law review excerpt on Linde's ideas is from his piece entitled
Are State Constitutions Common Law?, 9 and the focus is on Linde's critique
of state courts for following slavishly what Linde regards as flawed federal
constitutional doctrine instead of developing their own. The critique is
important, but it reflects a rather narrow aspect of Linde's overall thesis.
II. JUSTICE LINDE AND STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM
The most definitive presentation of Linde's views on state constitutionalism
remains his 1980 article, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of
Rights.' Justice William Brennan, Jr., in his famous Harvard Law Review
article,2 had already urged state courts to consider their own constitutions in
passing upon claims of right, but he did so on grounds that to Linde must have
seemed overly pragmatic. It was important, in Justice Brennan's view, for state
courts to fill in the gap that was in the process of being created by his
colleagues' ongoing retrenchment in the protection of rights under the federal
Constitution. Linde's argument, by contrast, is historical and analytical. The
provisions of state constitutions protective of individual rights are not mere
replications of the federal Bill of Rights; rather they precede, or (in the case of
more recent state constitutions) are based upon state constitutional provisions
which precede, and form the basis for, the first ten amendments. Moreover,
and perhaps more significantly, just as generally accepted principles of judicial
restraint dictate that a court should not decide a constitutional issue if the matter
can be resolved through statutory interpretation, so a court should not consider
18. Hans A. Linde, Are State Constitutions Common Law?, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 215 (1992)
[hereinafter State Constitutions], reprinted in INTELLECr AND CRAFr, supra note 1, at 91. Linde
is not necessarily advocating such an analysis or result, but rather considers it preferable to the
analysis used by the United States Supreme Court to deal with abortion questions.
19. See generally id.
20. Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT.
L. REV. 379 (1980). For earlier statements of the thesis, see Hans A. Linde, Without "Due"
Process in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125, 133-35 (1970); Hans A. Linde, Book Review, 52 OR. L.
REV. 325, 332-41 (1973) (reviewing BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIOHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1971)).
21. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
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a federal constitutional claim if the matter can be disposed of under the state's
own constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from denying
its citizens certain rights; if state law, including the state's constitution, respects
the right being asserted, an analysis of the claim under the federal Constitution
is unnecessary and inappropriate. Linde makes clear that state courts should
consider their own constitutions first, not because of any substantial
retrenchment occurring at the federal level, but because this consideration is
legally correct. These principles have gained acceptance over the last fifteen
years to the point where consideration of independent state grounds has become
commonplace in probably most state courts. It is not uncommon for federal
courts to rest their decisions on state constitutional grounds when available,'
and both lawyers and law students are coming to appreciate the importance of
asserting state constitutional arguments.'
It is also true that many courts are inconsistent in their approach, in some
cases confronting state constitutional issues first, in other cases ignoring them
in favor of decisions on federal constitutional grounds, and in still other cases
conflating federal and state constitutional analyses so that it becomes difficult to
determine the true ground for the decision.' Writing as a former state
supreme court justice (and one who, I might add, was sometimes guilty of such
offenses), I can attest that there are a number of explanations for this
phenomenon, depending both on the case and on the court.' One explanation
is that the lawyers in a particular case fail to raise state constitutional issues, and
the court either ignores the possibility to invite briefing on those issues or for
some reason does not consider it appropriate to do so. A second reason is that
the jurisprudence in a particular area may have been so well-developed under
the federal Constitution, and so weakly developed under the state constitution,
that the court simply finds it easier to decide the case on federal constitutional
grounds than to try to develop an independent state analysis. Finally, a state
court may prefer to insulate itself from criticism over what it predicts will be an
unpopular decision by fixing responsibility upon the Court in Washington. None
of these explanations constitute principled justification for ignoring Linde's first-
things-first prescription, however, if there is a principled rebuttal to that
prescription, I have yet to discover it.
22. E.g., Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1985).
23. For an excellent casebook in the field, see ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1993).
24. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (establishing a presumption that a state court
decided a constitutional case on federal grounds unless an independent state ground is clearly stated).
25. I have confessed my sins and acknowledged my debt to Linde in JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN
PURSUIT OF JUSTICE (1989).
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In subsequent articles, Linde has gone on to address a further, analytically
distinct question, which is how a state court should go about deciding a state
constitutional issue it has determined to confront.' There are really two issues
nere. One issue is the specific, and for some courts, threshold issue as to what
role federal Supreme Court constitutional decisions should play in the state
court's analysis. Thus, the issue becomes whether the Supreme Court's decision
is entitled to some sort of "deference" even though the Court is construing a
different document pertaining to a different polity, or whether the state court
should feel free to pursue an independent course. The second related issue is
how the state court should analyze the state constitutional issue, that is, whether
it should analyze a case in terms of the doctrine that the United States Supreme
Court has developed for analysis of the cognate federal constitutional issue, or
whether it should develop its own, possibly improved, doctrine.
Linde's view as to the first question is that a state court should approach
its state constitution as a truly independent document-that it should not only
refrain from following "lockstep" in the path trod by the United States Supreme
Court, but that it need not and should not insist upon a showing of some special
"justification" for departing from that path. State constitutions often contain
different language than the federal Constitution for describing constitutional
rights and state courts are often in a position to rely upon distinctive history or
doctrine, or political culture. However, none of these reasons are necessary to
depart from federal precedent, since no excuse is required. State constitutional
law is not common law to be molded into a homogenous body of principles.
United States Supreme Court opinions may prove as valuable as opinions of
other state courts, or of academic commentators, with respect to the analysis of
certain issues, but they are entitled to no greater weight.
Linde also has ideas when it comes to how state courts should go about the
task of giving meaning to their state constitutions, once they have accepted their
own autonomy. Not surprisingly, those ideas represent the flip-side of the
critique which he has waged against certain opinions of the United States
Supreme Court. Linde believes that state courts should think independently
about constitutional doctrine, and not accept unthinkingly, for example, the
Supreme Court's views about substantive due process, levels of equal protection
analysis, implied fundamental rights, and the like. He believes state courts
should eschew instrumentalist reasoning, attend to institutional considerations,
and seek to legitimize by grounding their decisions in constitutional analysis
rather than in "extra-constitutional" considerations. In other words, state courts
26. In addition to his article Are S.te Constitutions Common Law?, supra note 18, Linde
published E Pluribus - Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REv. 165 (1984). E
Pluribus was based upon his John A. Sibley Lecture in Law delivered at the University of Georgia
School of Law on October 18, 1983.
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should refrain from making the same "mistakes" the United States Supreme
Court has made. Linde advances here his own views about constitutional
doctrine and theory. But one need not embrace Linde's substance in order to
agree with the logic of his call for true state constitutional independence, both
with regard to the priority of decision making and the limited relevance of
United States Supreme Court opinions.
Yet, the principle of truly independent state constitutionalism, while gaining
in acceptance, still meets with strong resistance. Some courts and commentators
advocate, if not strict conformity to federal decisions in certain areas, 27 then
at least deference sufficient to require articulated justification for departing from
federal decisions-some difference in the state constitution's text, history, or
context which explains why the state constitution affords greater protection to
particular rights than the federal Constitution." For some, the deferential
posture seems more intuitive than intellectual; the High Court is, after all, the
high court, since it has greater experience with constitutional issues, and state
constitutions are not really meant to provide greater protection anyway. For
others, deference is appropriate when there are no differences among states with
regard to fundamental values or character that would support reasoned
constitutional discourse, 29 or because state coistitutionalism is but a "device for
advancing the liberal political agenda, "' or because uniformity is desirable in
order to provide predictability in certain types of cases,3" or as a means of
maintaining public confidence in a coherent body of fundamental rights.32
Much has been written in response to these criticisms, mostly of a
theoretical nature, and there is no need to recapitulate it here.33 It might be
27. For examples of the lockstep approach, see infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., A. E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the
Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873, 936 (1976); Robin B. Johansen, Note, The New Federalism:
Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State Constitutions, 29 STAN. L. REv. 297, 313 (1977).
29. See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MIcH. L. REV.
761 (1992); cf. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARv.
L. REV. 1147 (1993) (arguing in favor of state constitutionalism on the basis that it reflects a
diversity of interpretive bodies, all engaged in a common enterprise).
30. Earl M. Maltz, The Political Dynamic of the "New Judicial Federalism," 2 EMERGING
ISSUES IN ST. CONST. L. 233 (1989).
31. E.g., State v. Florance, 527 P.2d 1202 (Or. 1974) (declining to depart from federal search
and seizure principles on grounds that law enforcement officials need clear and uniform guidelines).
32. See Johansen, supra note 28, at 316-21.
33. Among the more influential pieces (in addition to those by Justice Linde) are: Shirley S.
Abrahamson, Divided We Stand: State Constitutions in a More Perfect Union, 18 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 723 (1991); Daniel Gordon, Superconstitutions Saving the Shunned: The State Constitution
Masquerading as Weaklings, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 965 (1994); Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the
Dawn of New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1 (1995); Burt Neuborne, A Brief Response to Failed Discourse, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 971 (1993);
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useful, however, to look at the practice of state constitutionalism in a particular
area, one that has produced examples of both conformity and non-conformity
with the controlling United States Supreme Court opinion, and see what
observations might be made.
III. STATE CONSTrrTIONALISM IN PRACTICE
The cases to be analyzed here reflect a remarkably common recurring fact
pattern. The police have a suspect in custody and are interrogating or are about
to interrogate him, after warning him of his constitutional right to remain silent
and advising him of his right to be represented by an attorney. An attorney
appears or calls and informs the police that a friend or relative of the suspect has
retained him to represent the suspect and that he wishes to talk with the subject
before the police question him any further. Nevertheless, the police proceed
with the interrogation, without notifying the suspect of the imminent availability
of counsel, and obtain a confession which is then offered into evidence at trial.
The question is whether the confession should be accepted or excluded. In
Moran v. Burbine," the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue for
the first time and held that the federal Constitution provided no bar to admission
of such a confession." Both before and after Burbine, nearly twenty state
courts addressed the issue. The pattern of their decisions is worth examining.
A. Pre-Burbine
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Burbine, about a
dozen state courts had considered the question and decided that the post-
notification evidence should be excluded.' The first court was the New York
Court of Appeals, which, in a line of cases beginning with People v. DiBiasi,
3 7
had developed the rule that once an attorney enters the proceeding the police
may not question the defendant further unless there is an affirmative waiver
David Schuman, A Failed Critique of State Constitutionalism, 91 MICH. L. REv. 274 (1992); Robert
F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court
Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REv. 353 (1984). For an excellent compendium of excerpts from
some of these and other articles, see WILLIAMs, supra note 23, at 297-364.
34. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
35. Id. at 434.
36. People v. Somerville, 703 P.2d 615 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674
(Del. 1983); Haliburton v. State, 475 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1985); Davis v. State, 287 So. 2d 399 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1973); People v. Smith, 442 N.E.2d 1325 (Il1. 1982); State v. Matthews, 408 So.
2d 1274 (La. 1982); Lodowski v. State, 490 A.2d 1228 (Md. 1985); Commonwealth v. McKenna,
244 N.E.2d 560 (Mass. 1969); People v. DiBiasi, 166 N.E.2d 825 (N.Y. 1960); Lewis v. State,
695 P.2d 528 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); State v. Haynes, 602 P.2d 272 (Or. 1979). A few courts
did not follow the majority rule. See State v. Blanford, 306 N.W.2d 93 (Iowa 1981); State v.
Smith, 241 S.E.2d 674 (N.C. 1978); State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d 22 (R.I. 1982).
37. 166 N.E.2d 825 (N.Y. 1960).
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made in the presence of counsel.' While the basis of the rule may at first
have been unclear, by 1963 there was no doubt that it was based upon New
York law, including the state's constitutional protection for the privilege against
self-incrimination, right to counsel, and due process. Chief Judge Fuld, in an
opinion for the court that year, declared: "Since we have concluded that a
confession obtained under the circumstances present here is inadmissible under
New York law, we find it unnecessary to consider whether or not the Supreme
Court of the United States would regard its use a violation of the defendant's
rights under the Federal Constitution."'"
Other states did not follow New York in insisting on a strict counsel-present
waiver, but most did insist that the failure to advise the suspect of the imminent
availability of counsel rendered the suspect's confession infirm. The Supreme
Court of Massachusetts' reached that conclusion on the basis of a statement
in Miranda that the suspect's "opportunity to exercise [the rights to remain silent
and to be represented by counsel] must be afforded to him throughout the
interrogation."' Similarly, the Florida Court of Appeal42 reached the same
result with summary reference to the suspect's "constitutional right to have
counsel" and with reliance on Escobedo v. Illinois.43 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reached its conclusion with similarly vague reference to denial
of the constitutional right of counsel." Then, the Oregon Supreme Court, in
an opinion by Justice Linde, decided State v. Haynes.45
Justice Linde was not writing on a clean slate, but neither was the slate
coherent. The Oregon Supreme Court had previously followed a wavering
course. Based primarily on its interpretation of federal law, the court initially
rejected the New York rule,' later acknowledging that changing federal
precedent had undercut the premises of that decision.47 Still later, the court
reaffirmed that a suspect who is already represented by counsel may nevertheless
waive counsel's presence and make a valid confession.' Noting that the issue
prior to arrest is one of the right to remain silent rather than the right to counsel
per se, Linde's opinion in Haynes declared agreement with the Massachusetts
and Pennsylvania courts "that when law enforcement officers have failed to
38. People v. Hobson, 348 N.E.2d 894, 896 (N.Y. 1976).
39. People v. Donovan, 193 N.E.2d 628, 629 (N.Y. 1963).
40. Commonwealth v. McKenna, 244 N.E.2d 560 (Mass. 1969).
41. Id. at 565-66.
42. Davis v. State, 287 So. 2d 399, 400 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
43. Id. (citing Escobedov. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)).
44. Commonwealth v. Hilliard, 370 A.2d 322 (Pa. 1977).
45. 602 P.2d 272 (Or. 1979).
46. State v. Kristich, 359 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Or. 1961).
47. State v. Neely, 398 P.2d 482, 485 (Or. 1965).
48. State v. Sanford, 421 P.2d 988, 992 (Or. 1966).
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admit counsel to a person in custody or to inform the person of the attorney's
efforts to reach him, they cannot thereafter rely on defendant's 'waiver' for the
use of his subsequent uncounseled statements or resulting evidence against
him."" Such a rule was appropriate, Linde reasoned, because "[t]o pass up
an abstract offer to call some unknown lawyer is very different from refusing
to talk with an identified attorney actually available to provide at least initial
assistance and advice .... "0 Significantly, this was a rule that would satisfy
the requirements of both the Oregon and federal constitutions sO
Justice Linde's common sense observation in Haynes that there is a
difference between waiving the right to counsel in the abstract and waiving the
right to counsel in the flesh, proved enormously influential with other courts.
For example, state supreme courts in Delaware,52 Florida,53 Illinois, 4
Louisiana,5" as well as intermediate appellate courts in Colorado,'
Oklahoma,5" and Marylands followed the Haynes rationale. Unfortunately,
however, most of these courts did not follow Judge Fuld's or Justice Linde's
lead in basing the result on their state constitutions. Louisiana did so, squarely
and exclusively;59 the Oklahoma court like Haynes, referred to both state and
federal constitutions;, but the other courts, while referring to other state cases,
49. State v. Haynes, 602 P.2d 272, 278-79 (Or. 1979).
50. Id. at 278.
51. It must be said that Justice Linde's opinion in Haynes, unlike subsequent opinions for the
Oregon court, does not entirely conform to his "first things first" prescription. Perhaps this
represents respect for the court's prior decisions.
52. Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674 (Del. 1983) ("We can not, and do not, conclude that a
suspect, who is indifferent to the usual abstract offer of counsel, recited as part of the warnings
required by Miranda, will disdain a chance to consult a lawyer waiting to see him then and there."
(quoting State v. Haynes, 602 P.2d 272, 278 (Or. 1979)).
53. Haliburton v. State, 476 So. 2d 192, 194 (Fla. 1985) (quoting from Chief Justice
Bevilacqua's dissenting opinion in State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d 22, 35 (R.I. 1982), which in turn
relied upon Haynes).
54. People v. Smith, 442 N.E.2d 1325 (Ill. 1982) (quoting at length from the Haynes analysis).
55. State v. Matthews, 408 So. 2d 1274 (La. 1982).
56. People v. Somerville, 703 P.2d 615, 617 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
57. Lewis v. State, 695 P.2d 528, 530 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) ("Our agreement with the
Oregon Supreme Court is strengthened by similar rulings in other jurisdictions.").
58. Lodowski v. State, 490 A.2d 1228 (Md. 1985); see also Elfadl v. State, 485 A.2d 275,280
(Md. App. 1985) ("It is one thing to say a lawyer has no right to see a client; it is quite another to
say that an accused knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel and his right against self-
incrimination when he is purposely kept in the dark about the fact that his lawyer is in the next
room.").
59. In Louisiana, the courts had previously adopted the majority rule on federal grounds, but
the state constitution had since been amended to incorporate the Miranda-like safeguards, and a state
statute guaranteed the right of arrested persons access to counsel. Consequently, the Louisiana
Supreme Court relied upon the amended constitution and the statute together with the Haynes
rationale in reaching its conclusion. State v. Matthews, 408 So. 2d 1274, 1277-78 (La. 1982).
60. Lewis, 695 P.2d at 529.
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phrased their holdings exclusively in federal constitutional terms.
A minority view also existed. Courts in Iowa and North Carolina rejected
the majority rule in favor of a "totality of circumstances" test.6' Rhode Island
also weighed in with a contrary position, and it was that decision which led to
the United States Supreme Court's consideration of the issue.
B. Moran v. Burbine
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court decided Moran v. Burbine.6
In Burbine, an assistant public defender, Ms. Munson, was retained by the
suspect's sister late the same afternoon the suspect was taken into custody on
suspicion of burglary.' Munson immediately telephoned the police station,
and a male voice answered "Detective."' Munson announced that she
represented the suspect, Burbine, and wished to speak to him before any further
questioning.' She was told the police were "through with" Burbine for the
night.' Lulled by this representation, Munson did not go to the station.67
Meanwhile, the police read Burbine his Miranda rights but did not tell him that
counsel had been retained or had attempted to reach him.' After a Miranda
waiver was obtained, interrogation began. During the evening, Burbine
confessed to a murder.'9
A divided Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed Burbine's conviction,
holding that the police had no duty under Miranda to advise him of counsel's
availability or to honor Munson's request for access.' On habeas, however,
the First Circuit granted Burbine relief.7l The United States Supreme Court
reversed, agreeing with the Rhode Island Supreme Court, six to three. 72
Federal law is satisfied by the giving of proper Miranda warnings, thus waiver
is unaffected by the subsequent interposition of counsel. 3 Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion reasoned that a suspect's ignorance of events outside the
61. State v. Blanford, 306 N.W.2d 93, 96 (Iowa 1981) (adopting a "totality of circumstances
test"); State v. Smith, 241 S.E.2d 674, 680-81 (N.C. 1978).
62. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
63. Id. at 416-17.
64. Id. at 417.
65. Id.
66. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 417 (1986).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 418.
70. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 418-19 (1986).
71. Id. at 419.
72. Id. at 434.
73. Id. at 422-23.
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interrogation room cannot render his voluntary waiver any less voluntary; thus,
there could be no violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.74 Nor was the Sixth Amendment violated, since the right to
counsel under that provision attaches only upon the filing of formal criminal
charges.75 Finally, while it may be unethical for police to withhold such
information from the suspect, such conduct in the case before the court was not
so egregious as to constitute a deprivation of the suspect's Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process of law.76 Nevertheless, the Court observed-
superfluously in light of Michigan v. Long-that states were free to adopt
different rules under state law.'
The Burbine dissenters took issue with the majority on several counts.
Miranda, they observed, contained language to the effect that a confession
obtained by "trickery" could be invalid even if obtained after a Miranda warning
and otherwise valid waiver, and in their view, intentional withholding of
information concerning the imminent availability of counsel fell within that
principle.' Such police misconduct also constituted, they argued, a denial of
due process of law." Ultimately, the case turned upon a
proper appraisal of the role of the lawyer in our society. If a lawyer
is seen as a nettlesome obstacle to the pursuit of wrongdoers-as in an
inquisitorial society-then the Court's decision today makes a good
deal of sense. If a lawyer is seen as an aid to the understanding and
protection of constitutional rights-as in an accusatorial society-then
today's decision makes no sense at all."'
C. Post-Burbine
When the Court decided Burbine, two similar cases were pending, one from
Florida and the other from Maryland, in which the state courts had relied on
federal law to conclude that confessions obtained in a Burbine-like scenario
should be excluded from evidence. The Supreme Court remanded these cases
for reconsideration in light of their recent decision.
74. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422-23 (1986).
75. Id. at 432.
76. Id. at 432-34.
77. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
78. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432-34 (1986).
79. Id. at 453-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 466-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 468 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Now, the state courts could not avoid confronting the state law issue. Both
did so, with opposite results. The Maryland court,' even though it found the
Burbine analysis of the Fifth Amendment issue not to be "persuasive," followed
the Burbine result on the basis of its own prior opinions. " Maryland's prior
decisions had declared the content of the state and federal self-incrimination
provisions to be congruent in meaning since the two provisions were adopted at
about the same time and arose out of similar concerns.' The Florida court,
however, relied upon the Burbine dissent and the reasoning of the Oregon
Supreme Court in Haynes to conclude that the suspect's statements had been
obtained in violation of the due process provisions of its state constitution.5
Since Burbine, two other state courts which had previously adopted a
position contrary to Burbine on federal constitutional grounds, or on ambiguous
grounds, have been called upon to address the issue anew. The Delaware
Supreme Court reaffirmed its pre-Burbine position on the basis of the state
constitutional right to counsel as an aspect of due process of law.t6 In doing
so, it relied upon the reasoning contained in its prior opinion, the dissent in
Burbine, and the decisions of other state courts.'
The Illinois Supreme Court likewise confirmed its prior conclusion, which
it characterized-not entirely convincingly-as resting in part on state
constitutional grounds.ss In support of its position on the merits, the Illinois
court relied in part upon the fact that Illinois had adopted a new constitution in
1970, and that convention debates indicated that the language of the self-
incrimination provision was intended to incorporate then-existing federal
constitutional principles which, according to the court, included a principle
contrary to Burbine." The court relied also upon the history of state court
precedents in the areas of due process, self-incrimination, and right to counsel,
82. Lodowski v. State, 513 A.2d 299 (Md. 1986).
83. Id. at 304.
84. Id. at 306-07.
85. Haliburton v. State, 514 So. 2d 1088, 1090 (Fla. 1987).
86. Bryan v. State, 571 A.2d 170, 175-77 (Del. 1990).
87. Id.
88. People v. McCauley, 645 N.E.2d 923 (Il. 1994). The court characterized People v. Smith,
442 N.E.2d 1325 (il. 1982), as resting partly on state law because it relied upon the Oregon
Supreme Court's decision in Haynes, id. at 930, but as discussed in the text, supra notes 45-60,
Justice Linde's opinion in Haynes relied only tangentially on state law, and in any event that was
Oregon law, not Illinois law. As Justice Bilandic observed in his separate opinion in McCauley,
Smith neither cited nor discussed the Illinois constitutional privilege against self incrimination. Id.
at 941. After Smith, the Illinois court had decided two cases, People v. Holland, 520 N.E.2d 270,
277-78 (I1. 1987) and People v. Griggs, 604 N.E.2d 257, 269 (II1. 1992), in which the court
distinguished Burbine on its facts. Thus, according to Justice Bilandic, McCauley represented a
change of course on the part of the Illinois court. McCauley, 645 N.E.2d at 941.
89. Id. at 929-30.
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as well as a pre-Miranda statute requiring public officers to allow persons in
custody to "admit any practicing attorney . . . whom such person . . . may
desire to see or consult."' "Considering these facts and principles," the court
declared, "it is clear that the constitutional and statutory policies of our State
favor a person having the assistance of counsel during custodial interrogation
... . "91 The court implicitly rejected the view of Justice Bilandic, in dissent,
that the conclusion had to be justified on the basis of constitutional language or
history suggesting that the framers intended the state privilege to be broader than
the Fifth Amendment.
In addition, since Burbine, some fourteen courts which had not previously
taken a position on the issue have been called upon to do so. The pattern is
quite varied. The supreme courts in Indiana,' North Carolina,93 South
Carolina,9 and Mississippi" have followed Burbine without referring to their
respective state constitutions. The Supreme Court of Alabama, while referring
to its state constitution, followed Burbine in lockstep without independent state
constitutional analysis.' The Washington Supreme Court likewise followed
Burbine on the basis of prior decisions which had declared the state court
protection for the right of self-incrimination to be congruent with the Fifth
Amendment.97
Two state supreme courts have chosen to follow Burbine on the basis of
their own state constitutional analysis. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, while
relying heavily upon the reasoning of Burbine and noting that there were no
differences in the relevant constitutional language, also expressed its independent
concern that a contrary rule would unfairly distinguish among suspects whose
families or friends were or were not in a position to engage the services of an
attorney and that the rule would be difficult to apply as circumstances varied.9
The Supreme Court of Tennessee, without indicating any particular deference
to the federal view, engaged in an extensive survey of state court opinions on
the issue and found itself persuaded by the reasoning, not only of Burbine, but
also of the state courts which had accepted that view, finding the logic of
90. Id. at 938.
91. Id.
92. McClaskey v. State, 540 N.E.2d 41 (Ind. 1989).
93. State v. Reese, 353 S.E.2d 352 (N.C. 1987).
94. State v. Drayton, 361 S.E.2d 329 (S.C. 1987).
95. Lee v. State, 631 So. 2d 824 (Miss. 1994).
96. Ex Parte Neelley, 494 So. 2d 697, 699 (Ala. 1986) ("Applying Moran... of the present
case, we hold that neither petitioner's Fifth nor Sixth Amendment rights were violated... [n]or do
we find this conduct by law enforcement officials violative of the constitution of this state.").
97. State v. Earls, 805 P.2d 211 (Wash. 1991).
98. State v. Hanson, 401 N.W.2d 771, 777-78 (Wis. 1987).
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Burbine to be compatible with its own prior decisions." Nothing in the
Tennessee court's opinion suggests that it was acceding to the Supreme Court's
position by default.
Finally, courts in three states-California,t  Michigan,' and
Connecticut2--which had not previously considered the issue, departed from
the Burbine analysis and concluded, on the basis of their state constitutions, that
at least under certain circumstances the failure of police to notify a suspect
under interrogation of the imminent availability of counsel requires exclusion of
an admission or confession. In New Jersey, where the constitution contains no
privilege against self-incrimination, the supreme court reached a similar result
on the basis of statutory protection for that privilege.' 3 In Kentucky, the
supreme court, relying on the state's rules of criminal procedure, upheld a trial
court's order requiring police to cease questioning a suspect until his family-
referred counsel could speak with him."14
The California Supreme Court, while declaring that the Supreme Court's
decisions defining "fundamental rights and liberties are entitled to respectful
consideration," reached its conclusion on the basis of reasoning contained in
opinions of other state courts and in the Burbine dissent, without suggesting that
any particular justification for departing from federal precedent was
required. " The Michigan court, with a somewhat more extensive analysis
of other state cases, followed California's lead. The Connecticut Supreme
Court, in arriving at its position on the issue for the first time after Burbine was
decided, drew upon that state's "long history of recognizing the significance of
the right to counsel, even before that right attained federal constitutional
importance," and upon its long due process tradition, which it had previously
held to require Miranda warnings as a matter of state constitutional law." 6
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in basing its decision on that state's
statutory protection of the privilege against self-incrimination, delved into the
history of the provision's implementation in the courts, noting a judicial tradition
99. State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530 (renn. 1994).
100. People v. Houston, 724 P.2d 1166 (Cal. 1986). The ruling in Houston was subsequently
.overruled" by constitutional amendment.
101. People v. Wright, 490 N.W.2d 351 (Mich. 1992).
102. State v. Stoddard, 537 A.2d 446 (Conn. 1988).
103. State v. Reed, 627 A.2d 630 (N.J. 1993).
104. West v. Commonwealth, 887 S.W.2d 338 (Ky. 1994).
105. People v. Houston, 724 P.2d 1166, 1174 (Cal. 1986). 1 am obliged to disclose that I was
the author of the Houston opinion, and to confess that, while I adhere to the result, in retrospect I
think the reasoning could have been improved by reference to the history of development of
protections for criminal defendants by California courts.
106. State v. Stoddard, 537 A.2d 446, 451 (Conn. 1988).
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recognizing "ancillary rights," including the right to counsel, as essential to the
preservation of the privilege."°7 The court, surveying the opinions of other
state courts before and after Burbine, which imposed upon police a duty to
inform a suspect that an attorney is waiting, noted that the several state courts
differed in their theoretical approaches, but suggested that they all proceeded
from "one supervening principle: the atmosphere of custodial interrogation is
inherently coercive and protecting the right against self-incrimination entails
counteracting that coercion. " " Requiring police to inform the suspect of an
attorney's presence, the court opined, would be the "most practical means to
overcome coercion," as it would "greatly reduce the temptation of law
enforcement authorities to pressure the suspect into a confession before the
attorney gains access to the suspect."" The court considered and rejected
modifications which had been adopted by some other state courts, such as the
"totality of circumstances" test, or a "balancing test," in favor of a "bright line"
rule. 11
0
IV. SOME LESSONS
What observations that might be relevant to our understanding of the nature
of state constitutionalism can be made with respect to this sampling of cases?
I suggest the following. First, in practice, and despite some areas of judicial
foot-dragging, the study suggests that state constitutionalism is alive and well.
Overall, the debate among the state courts following Burbine has been richer and
more complex than the majority and dissenting opinions in Burbine itself. State
courts have grappled with issues that were not considered by the United States
Supreme Court-whether, for example, rejection of Burbine would involve
difficulty in assuring that a lawyer has authority to represent the suspect, or
whether it would privilege suspects with friends or relatives wealthy enough to
afford a lawyer. State courts have thus confronted and decided various
alternatives to the Burbine rule: whether, for example, police should be
required to advise a suspect of the imminent availability of a lawyer only when
the lawyer is physically present at the police station or when the lawyer has
called on the telephone; whether it makes a difference that the lawyer is a public
defender rather than a private attorney; and whether the exclusion of a
confession from evidence should follow automatically from a failure by police
to advise the suspect as required or only where the "totality of circumstances"
points to involuntariness of waiver."'
107. State v. Reed. 627 A.2d 630, 637 (N.J. 1993).
108. Id. at 640.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 644-45.
111. The Connecticut Supreme Court, for example, has declined to follow what appears to be
the majority rule that lack of knowledge of the imminent availability of counsel is always fatal to
valid waiver, and insists that the determination be made on the basis of factors such as the
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Second, while the almost uniform failure by state courts to discuss their
state constitutions prior to Burbine is certainly understandable given the
assumptions which then prevailed, in retrospect, there is little that can be said
in principled support of that practice. The Supreme Court had never passed
upon that issue, and its decisions surrounding the self-incrimination privilege and
the right to counsel provided no strong basis for predicting what the Court
would do. Courts which bypassed their state constitutions in favor of answering
the federal question not only violated principles of logic and judicial constraint;
they assumed the risk that if they were wrong, as they proved to be, they would
incur the embarrassment of being told (directly or in effect) to do what they
should have done in the first place. State courts would have created a needless
period of uncertainty, and they would have foregone the opportunity to begin
laying a foundation for the development of state constitutional principles. Of
course, given the assumptions which then prevailed, the practice was
understandable; the state constitutional alternative probably never even occurred
to these courts. There is even less to be said in support of those courts which
continued to ignore state law after Burbine was decided.
Third, the sampling of cases demonstrates some of the difficulties, both
theoretical and practical, with the "lockstep" approach in which a court decides,
in advance, that it will follow the United States Supreme Court's lead. Even if
it is assumed that the framers of a particular state constitution "intended" that
its self-incrimination and right to counsel provisions would be given roughly the
same meaning as comparable provisions of the federal Constitution, they
certainly had no clue as to what meaning would be attached to the latter with
respect to the issue in Burbine. The outcome in Burbine could not reasonably
be said to have been based upon either some deciphering of the text or upon any
evidence of original intent. Rather, the Burbine decision was based on the
Court's application of the principles which had been declared in Miranda and
Escobedo, and these in turn were premised upon neither text nor history, but
upon what the Court considered necessary for the effective implementation of
the underlying constitutional principles. Thus, for the Washington court to say
that the Washington constitutional provisions at issue had the same meaning as
the federal constitutional provisions"2 is the equivalent of saying that the
framers of the state constitution intended for those provisions to have whatever
meaning might be attributed to them in the future by the United States Supreme
Court, without regard to whatever differences might otherwise exist. For the
Maryland court to say the same thing in the face of its own articulated
relationship of the suspect to the attorney, the nature of counsel's request, the extent to which the
police had reasonable notice of counsel's request, and the conduct of the suspect. See State v.
Stoddard, 537 A.2d 446, 456 (Conn. 1988).
112. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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disagreement with the United States Supreme Court's reasoning"3 carries the
proposition one step further. For both courts, the troubling question remains:
what if the United States Supreme Court one day reverses Burbine? Will they
be prepared to carry the lockstep approach to its logical conclusion? If so, what
principles of constitutional adjudication-what language, or constitutional
history, or reasoning-support that result?
Finally, the study suggests the lack of any principled foundation for a
state's approach which takes United States Supreme Court decisions as its
starting point and then requires some justification for departing from them.
With respect to the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to counsel, and
due process of law, there were no significant textual differences (except in New
Jersey) between the relevant state and federal constitutional provisions. Further,
while the Illinois court relied upon the proceedings underlying the 1970 state
constitutional convention as indicating an intent to embody certain then existing
federal constitutional principles, 14 it would be impossible to contend that the
right to be informed, prior to arrest, of the imminent availability of a lawyer (as
distinguished from the more general right to counsel) was expressly one of those
principles. Moreover, while some courts, such as in Connecticut, relied upon
a generalized history of protecting certain rights,"5 most courts found nothing
specific to rely on. Thus, an insistence upon textual or historical justification
for departing from federal precedent might prove, in this context, fatal to any
independent course.
But why, in the end, should deference to the United States Supreme Court
be required? The Supreme Court's decision in Burbine did not turn upon any
matters-assuming there are such matters-within the special competence of that
Court. What divided the majority and the dissenters within the Court was, in
part, disagreement over what might be called social facts (for example the
psychological difference between the suspect knowing about an abstract right to
counsel and knowing that a particular lawyer is waiting to talk with him, or the
likely impact upon police behavior of adopting one rule or another). Another
part of the disagreement occurred over what might be characterized as issues of
moral or political philosophy: how far society should go in enabling a suspect
to connect with counsel prior to or during interrogation, in light of the virtual
certainty that the connection will in most cases result in the suspect being
unwilling to talk. As to the social facts, the state courts are likely to be in a
better position-and surely in no worse-than the United States Supreme Court
to know what goes on in the jailhouse. There is no reason to believe that state
court judges are any less adept at moral or philosophical reasoning, or in
113. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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extrapolating from the principles of Miranda and Escobedo, both of which had
their origins in state court decisions. If a state court is persuaded by the
reasoning of the Burbine dissent, and says so, surely that does not render the
state court's opinion "unprincipled."
Proponents of state deference in the Burbine context seem to be left, at
bottom, only with an argument based upon the desirability of uniformity.
However, there is no need for uniformity in order to provide predictability for
affected parties. Law enforcement officials can easily learn whatever rule is
adopted in a particular state with respect to the need to advise suspects of the
presence of counsel who wish to talk with them. Within a system premised on
federalism, it seems odd to argue that the advantages of diversity must be
sacrificed in order to give the appearance of consensus with respect to the
content of "fundamental rights." Citizens who are aware of the lack of
consensus within the United States Supreme Court itself are not likely to be
surprised, or offended, by the lack of uniformity among the states. Justice
Linde has put it well:
Ultimately the question is whether we can face diversity in
constitutional rights. Recognition that a right may be guaranteed in
one state but not in another is an uncomfortable idea .... [I]t departs
from the civic faith imparted by high school and college classes, by
national organizations and media reports, and by our public rhetoric,
that 'constitutional rights' must mean rights shared by all Americans.
Yet, of course, the uncomfortable idea is true... Constitutional
law is indeed a shared enterprise. But for state courts the enterprise
is to apply and enforce the actual guarantees that a state's charter
provides, not to substitute a homogenized rhetoric of judicial review.
The task for counsel and for the state's academic and professional
observers is to hold judges to that enterprise, and to help them in
it.'16
116. See State Constitutions, supra note 18, at 229.
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